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We analyze the effects of money injections on interest rates and
exchange rates when agents must pay a Baumol-Tobin-style fixed cost
to exchange bonds and money. Asset markets are endogenously seg-
mented because this fixed cost leads agents to trade bonds and money
infrequently. When the government injects money through an open
market operation, only those agents that are currently trading absorb
these injections. Through their impact on these agents’ consumption,
these money injections affect real interest rates and real exchange
rates. The model generates the observed negative relation between
expected inflation and real interest rates as well as persistent liquidity
effects in interest rates and volatile and persistent exchange rates.
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Several features of the observed relationships between money and both
interest rates and exchange rates are difficult to account for in standard
monetary models. Motivated by the work of Baumol (1952) and Tobin
(1956), economists have argued that adding frictions that lead to a
segmented market for trading money and interest-bearing assets might
help improve these models (see Grossman andWeiss [1983], Rotemberg
[1984, 1985], and Lucas [1990], among others). Here we build on this
literature by developing a model with endogenously segmented asset
markets. Our model is both simple and promising as a way to account
for the data.
In our model, agents must pay a fixed cost to transfer money between
the asset market and the goods market. This fixed cost leads agents to
trade bonds and money only infrequently. In any given period, only a
fraction of agents are actively trading; that is, the asset market is seg-
mented. When the government injects money through an open market
operation, only the currently active agents are on the other side of the
transaction, and only their marginal utilities determine interest rates
and exchange rates. Money injections are absorbed exclusively by these
active agents: the injections increase active agents’ current consumption;
hence, real interest rates fall and the real exchange rate depreciates.
We refer to this effect of money injections on real interest rates and
real exchange rates as the segmentation effect.
Our main contribution here is to derive with pencil and paper the
implications of segmented asset markets for the relationships of money,
interest rates, and exchange rates for stochastic processes for shocks
motivated by the data. Our derivation sheds light on how the compli-
cated relationships between money, interest rates, and exchange rates
are all driven by a simpler one, namely, the relationship between money
injections and the marginal utility of active agents. We also show that
some predictions of a simple, quantitative version of our model come
close to matching features of the data that standard models without
segmentation have not been able to produce.
We begin with two features of interest rates that have been difficult
to account for in standard monetary models. First, expected inflation
and real interest rates generally move in opposite directions. This has
been documented by Barr and Campbell (1997) using indexed and
nominal bonds (see also Pennacchi 1991; Campbell and Ammer 1993).
Second, at least since Friedman (1968), open market operations have
been thought to have liquidity effects: money injections lead initially to
a decline in short-term nominal interest rates, a decline that is thought
to decay over time, with short-term rates eventually rising to normal
levels or higher. Accordingly, money injections are thought to steepen
the yield curve, lowering long-term rates less than short-term rates, or
even to twist the yield curve by raising long-term rates. The vector au-
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toregression (VAR) literature has been somewhat successful in confirm-
ing these patterns in the data (see Cochrane 1994; Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans 1998).
Our model with segmented asset markets can produce both of these
features whereas a standard model cannot. In a standard model without
market segmentation, persistent money injections increase expected in-
flation but have no effects on real interest rates, so the model induces
no relation between them. In addition, these injections raise nominal
interest rates of all maturities and flatten or even invert the yield curve.
In our model, however, money injections move expected inflation and
real interest rates in opposite directions. These injections thus generate
the negative correlation between expected inflation and real interest
rates that is observed in the data. Also, if asset markets are sufficiently
segmented, money injections in our model have liquidity effects: money
injections lower short-term nominal interest rates and steepen or even
twist the yield curve by lowering short rates and raising long ones. We
show that with moderate amounts of segmentation, our model can pro-
duce dynamic responses similar to those found in the VAR literature.
Moreover, our model generates persistent real effects from market seg-
mentation even from anticipated shocks. Cochrane (1998) argues that
a reasonable interpretation of the VAR results may require models with
this property.
After our look at money and interest rates, we turn to some prominent
features of money and exchange rates. These features are different for
countries with different rates of inflation. For low-inflation countries,
real and nominal exchange rates have similar variability, these rates are
highly correlated, and both are persistent. For high-inflation countries,
real exchange rates are much less volatile than nominal exchange rates.
A standard model can produce none of these features, but our en-
dogenously segmented model can produce them all. In a standard
model, money injections do not affect real exchange rates, and they
affect nominal exchange rates only through their impact on inflation.
In our model, however, when inflation is low, asset markets are seg-
mented and money injections have a substantial impact on real
exchange rates. With moderate amounts of segmentation, therefore,
real and nominal exchange rates have similar variability, they are highly
correlated, and both are persistent, just as in the data. When inflation
is high, agents trade more frequently, markets become less segmented,
and money injections have a smaller impact on real exchange rates.
Hence, in our model as in the data on high-inflation countries, real
exchange rates are significantly less volatile than nominal exchange
rates.
Our model with segmented markets is a standard cash-in-advance
model with the addition of fixed costs for agents to exchange money
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and bonds. In our model, the household begins each period with some
cash in the goods market; the money injection is then realized, and the
household then splits into a worker and a shopper. The worker sells
the current endowment for cash, and the shopper decides either to buy
goods with just the current real balances or to pay the fixed cost to
transfer cash to or from the asset market and then buy goods. The
household’s endowment and, thus, the household’s cash holdings are
random and idiosyncratic.
The shopper follows a cutoff rule that defines zones of activity and
inactivity for trading cash and interest-bearing assets. In the zones of
activity, shoppers with high real balances pay a fixed cost to transfer
cash to the asset market, whereas shoppers with low real balances pay
a fixed cost to obtain cash from the asset market. Shoppers with inter-
mediate real balances are in the zone of inactivity. They do not pay a
fixed cost; they simply spend their current real balances. Over time,
households stochastically cycle through the zones of activity and inac-
tivity as their idiosyncratic shocks vary. If the fixed cost is zero, all agents
are active, and the model reduces to a standard one similar to that of
Lucas (1984).
Ours is a fully stochastic model with both aggregate money shocks
and idiosyncratic endowment shocks. In it, agents trade a complete set
of state-contingent bonds in the asset market, and thus markets are as
complete as they can be subject to the trading friction. Even with the
complete markets, however, the trading friction leads agents with dif-
ferent idiosyncratic endowment shocks to have potentially different con-
sumption. Agents use these bonds to insure away the effects of their
idiosyncratic endowment realizations on their portfolios of claims in the
asset market, and hence, in equilibrium, all agents have the same wealth.
This feature of the model vastly simplifies the analysis.
When discussing exchange rates, we use a two-country version of our
segmented markets economy. In this two-currency, cash-in-advance
model, shoppers must use the local currency to purchase the local good.
We abstract from trade in goods across countries in order to focus on
the role of asset market segmentation. By doing so, we follow the spirit
of Lucas (1978) in using marginal rates of substitution to price assets
even though there is no trade in equilibrium.
There is a large literature in this general area. Our paper is clearly
related to the work of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). More recently,
Jovanovic (1982), Romer (1986), and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992)
have developed general equilibrium versions of Baumol’s and Tobin’s
models and have used their versions to study how different constant
inflation rates affect the steady state. In contrast to these studies, how-
ever, ours examines the dynamic responses of interest rates and
exchange rates to money growth shocks.
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Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984, 1985) study the
dynamic responses of interest rates and exchange rates in deterministic
models with exogenous segmentation. In addition to this segmentation,
the Grossman-Weiss-Rotemberg models exogenously limit asset trade to
uncontingent bonds. Because of that market incompleteness, these
models have—besides the pure liquidity effects from the trading fric-
tions—complicated wealth effects that effectively limit these studies to
one-time unanticipated shocks in deterministic environments. Gross-
man (1987) extends this work to include proportional costs of trading
money and assets and, hence, endogenous segmentation, but because
of the market incompleteness, his work is also limited to one-time un-
anticipated shocks in deterministic environments.
We go beyond this literature by analyzing a fully stochastic model with
shocks motivated by the processes in the data. Such a step is clearly
required to develop the empirical implications of market segmentation.
We take this step by drawing on a device of Lucas (1990) that lets us
abstract from wealth effects. Lucas organizes agents into coalitions in
which agents pool their resources and choose consumption subject to
a single budget constraint for the coalition as a whole, subject to re-
strictions on the trading technology. Given the trading technology, then,
markets are complete. Thus money injections have real effects only
because of the trading frictions and not because of additional exogenous
market incompleteness. We follow Lucas and allow agents to trade a
complete set of state-contingent bonds in the asset market in order to
eliminate complicated but inessential wealth effects.
We differ from Lucas in terms of both the trading friction used and
the results obtained. He assumes that the coalition must divide its cash
each period into one portion to be used to purchase goods and another
portion to be traded for bonds in the asset market before the size of
the current open market operation is announced. Unfortunately, in that
model, only unexpected money shocks have real effects. Hence, the
model cannot produce the Barr and Campbell (1997) observations on
expected inflation and real interest rates. Moreover, in that model, li-
quidity effects last only one period. Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1995) extend Lucas’s (1990) model to include produc-
tion, and they get similar results. Grilli and Roubini (1992) and Schla-
genhauf and Wrase (1995a) extend this work to the open economy.
They also find that the response of real exchange rates to money in-
jections lasts only one period. In related work, Alvarez and Atkeson
(1997) use coalitions to extend the work of Rotemberg (1985), but with
this friction, markets can be highly segmented only if velocity is ex-
tremely low.
In an extension of their basic model, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995) add quadratic
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costs of adjusting the portfolio between periods to the infinite adjust-
ment costs within the period. They show that this setup can generate
persistent liquidity effects. Evans and Marshall (1998) use that extended
model to analyze the responses of interest rates of different maturities
to money shocks. Dotsey and Ireland (1995) and Schlagenhauf and
Wrase (1995b) criticize the lack of symmetry in such a model between
the adjustment costs within a period and across periods. Dotsey and
Ireland show that when a model has quadratic costs of adjustment both
within and across periods, the liquidity effects are small.
In contrast to the trading frictions in the literature initiated by Lucas
(1990), our trading frictions are close to those of the Baumol-Tobin
models. These frictions can generate Barr and Campbell’s (1997) ob-
servations and persistent liquidity effects even though costs are sym-
metric. Moreover, in our study, all the results can be derived with paper
and pencil, so that the essential driving forces in the model are easily
seen.
I. A One-Country Economy
First we sketch the basic outline of our model economy, and then we
fill in the details.
A. The Outline
We begin with a one-country, cash-in-advance economy with an infinite
number of time periods a government, and a continuumtp 0, 1, 2, … ,
of households of measure 1. Trade in this economy occurs in two sep-
arate locations: an asset market and a goods market. In the asset market,
households trade cash and bonds that promise delivery of cash in the
asset market in the next period, and the government introduces cash
into the asset market via open market operations. In the goods market,
households use cash to buy goods subject to a cash-in-advance constraint,
and households sell their endowments of goods for cash. Households
face a real fixed cost of g for each transfer of cash between the asset
market and the goods market. Except for this fixed cost, the model is
a standard cash-in-advance model like that of Lucas (1984).
This economy has two sources of uncertainty: idiosyncratic shocks to
households’ endowments and shocks to money growth. The timing
within each period is illustrated in figure 1. We emphasize thet ≥ 1
physical separation between markets by placing the asset market in the
top half of the figure and the goods market in the bottom half. House-
holds enter the period with the cash they obtained from sellingP y1 1
their endowments at where P1 is the price level and y1 is theirt 1,
idiosyncratic random endowment at The government conductst 1.
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an open market operation in the asset market, which determines the
realization of money growth m and the current price level P.
Each household then splits into a worker and a shopper. The worker
sells the household endowment y for cash Py and rejoins the shopper
at the end of the period. The shopper takes the household’s cash
with real value and shops for goods. The shopperP y mp P y /P1 1 1 1
can choose to pay the fixed cost g to transfer cash Px with real value x
to or from the asset market. This fixed cost is paid in cash obtained in
the asset market. If the shopper pays the fixed cost, then the cash-in-
advance constraint is where c is consumption; otherwise, thiscp m x,
constraint is Here and elsewhere, we assume that the shopper’scp m.
cash-in-advance constraint binds. Thus consumers choose not to carry
cash in the goods market from one period to the next. Instead, they
save by holding interest-bearing securities in the asset market. In Ap-
pendix A, we provide sufficient conditions for this assumption to hold.
Each household also enters the period with bonds that are claims to
cash in the asset market with payoffs contingent on both the household’s
idiosyncratic endowment y1 and the rate of money growth m in the
current period. This cash either can be reinvested in the asset market
or, if the fixed cost is paid, can be transferred to the goods market.
Likewise, if the fixed cost is paid, then cash from the goods market can
be transferred to the asset market and used to buy new bonds. In figure
1, the asset market constraint is if the fixed cost is′Bp qB  P(x g)∫
paid and otherwise, where B denotes the current realization′Bp qB∫
of the state-contingent bonds and the household’s purchases of new′qB∫
bonds. At the beginning of the next period, period this householdt 1,
starts with cash Py in the goods market and contingent bonds in the′B
asset market.
In equilibrium, some households choose to pay the fixed cost to
transfer cash between the goods and asset markets and others do not.
We refer to households that pay the fixed cost as active and households
that do not as inactive. Households with either sufficiently low real bal-
ances or sufficiently high real balances are active. Households with low
real balances transfer cash from the asset market to the goods market,
whereas those with high real balances transfer cash in the opposite
direction. Households with intermediate levels of real balances are in
a zone of inactivity and simply consume their current real balances.
In this economy, bonds are a complete set of contingent claims to
cash in the asset market. These complete contingent claims, however,
pay off in the asset market. Accordingly, households do not choose
identical consumption because they must pay a fixed cost to transfer
cash between the goods and asset markets.
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B. The Details
Now we flesh out the outline of this economy.
Each household’s endowment y is independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) across households and across time with distribution F,
which has density f. Let be the constant aggregate endow-Yp yf(y)dy∫
ment. Let denote a typical history of individual shocksty p (y , … , y )0 t
to endowments up through period t and thet …f(y )p f(y )f(y ) f(y )0 1 t
probability density over such histories. Let Mt denote the aggregate stock
of money in period t and the growth rate of that moneym p M /Mt t t1
supply. Let denote the history of money growth shockstm p (m , … ,m )1 t
up through period t and the probability density over such histories.tg(m )
To make all households identical in period 0, we need to choose the
initial conditions carefully. In period 0, households have units ofB¯
government debt, which is a claim on dollars in the asset market inB¯
period 0. In this period, households trade only in bonds, not in goods.
In period 1, households also have real balances in the goodsy /m0 1
market, where y0 also has distribution F and m1 is the money growth
shock at the beginning of period 1.
The government issues one-period bonds with payoffs contingent on
the aggregate state mt. In period t, given state mt, the government pays
off outstanding bonds in cash and issues claims to cash in thetB(m )
next asset market of the form at prices The gov-t tB(m , m ) q(m , m ).t1 t1
ernment budget constraint in period given state mt, ist ≥ 1,
t t t1 t tB(m )p M(m )M(m ) q(m , m )B(m , m )dm . (1) t1 t1 t1
mt1
In period 0, this constraint is B¯p q(m )B(m )dm .∫m 1 1 11
In the asset market in each period and state, households trade a
complete set of one-period bonds that have payoffs next period that are
contingent on both the aggregate event and the household’s en-mt1
dowment realization yt. A household in period t with aggregate state m
t
and individual shock history purchases claims tot1 t t1y B(m , m , y , y )t1 t
cash that pay off in the next period contingent on the aggregate shock
and the household’s endowment shock yt. We let be
tm q(m , m , y )t1 t1 t
the price of such a bond that pays $1.00 in the asset market in period
contingent on the relevant events. Because individual endowmentst 1
are i.i.d., we assume that these bond prices do not depend on the
individual shock history t1y .
Instead of letting each household trade in all possible claims contin-
gent on other households’ endowments, we suppose that each house-
hold trades only in claims contingent on the household’s own endow-
ment with a financial intermediary. This intermediary buys government
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bonds and trades in the household-specific contingent claims. The latter
approach is much less cumbersome than the former and yields the same
outcomes. Specifically, the intermediary buys government bonds
and sells household-specific claims of the form to allt1 t1 tB(m ) B(m , y )
the households in order to maximize profits for each aggregate state
:t1m
t1 t1 t1 t t t1 tq(m , y )B(m , y , y )f(y )dy  q(m )B(m , m ) t t t1
ty
subject to the constraint Arbitrage im-t1 t1 t t ttB(m )p B(m , y )f(y )dy .∫y
plies that t1 t1q(m , y )p q(m )f(y ).t t
Consider now the problem of an individual household. Let P(mt)
denote the price level in the goods market in period t. In that market,
in each period a household starts with real balances t t1t ≥ 1, m(m , y ).
It then chooses transfers of real balances between the goods market
and the asset market an indicator variable equalt t1 t t1x(m , y ), z(m , y )
to zero if these transfers are zero and one if they are not, and con-
sumption subject to the cash-in-advance constraint:t t1c(m , y )
t t1 t t1 t t1 t t1c(m , y )p m(m , y ) x(m , y )z(m , y ), (2)
where in (2), when the term is given by Newt t1tp 1, m(m , y ) y /m .0 1
money balances in period are given by t1 tt 1 m (m , y )p
t t1P(m )y /P(m ).t
In the asset market, each period a household starts with contingent
claims to cash delivered in the asset market. The householdt t1B(m , y )
purchases new bonds and makes cash transfers to or from the goods
market subject to the sequence of budget constraints for :t ≥ 1
t t1 t t t1B(m , y )p q(m ,m )B(m ,m , y , y )f(y )dm dy  t1 t1 t t t1 t
m yt1 t
t t t1 t t1 P(m )[x(m , y ) g]z(m , y ). (3)
In period this asset market constraint istp 0,
B¯p q(m )B(m , y )f(y )dy dm .  1 1 0 0 0 1
m y1 0
Assume that both consumption and real bond holdings tB(m ,
are uniformly bounded by some large constants.t1 ty )/P(m )
The problem for a consumer is to maximize utility

t t t1 t t1 t t1b U(c(m , y ))g(m )f(y )dmdy (4)  
tp0
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subject to the constraints (2) and (3).
The economy has a firm that transfers cash between the asset market
and the goods market. Since each transfer of cash consumes g units of
goods, the total resource cost of carrying out all transfers at t is
The firm purchases these goods in the goodst t1 t1 t1g z(m , y )f(y )dy .∫
market with cash obtained from consumers.
The resource constraint is given by
t t1 t t1 t1 t1[c(m , y ) gz(m , y )]f(y )dy p Y (5)
for all t, mt, and the money market–clearing condition is given by
tM(m )
t t1 t t1 t t1 t1 t1p {m(m , y ) [x(m , y ) g]z(m , y )}f(y )dy (6)tP(m )
for all t, mt. An equilibrium is defined in the obvious way.
II. Characterizing Equilibrium
Here we solve for the equilibrium consumption and real balances of
active and inactive households. In Section III, we characterize the link
between the consumption of active households and asset prices.
Again, throughout we assume that the cash-in-advance constraint al-
ways binds and the households hold only interest-bearing securities in
the asset market. Under this assumption, a household’s decision to pay
the fixed cost to trade in period t affects only its current consumption
and bond holdings and not the real balances it holds in the goods
market in later periods.
Inactive households simply consume the real balances they currently
hold in the goods market. More interesting is the consumption of active
households. Since the economy has a complete set of state-contingent
bonds, once a household pays the fixed cost to transfer cash between
markets, it equates its intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to that
of other active households. Since all households are identical ex ante,
all active households have a common consumption level that de-tc (m )A
pends only on the aggregate money shock mt and not on their idiosyn-
cratic endowments.
We first construct the zones of activity and inactivity for an arbitrary
consumption level cA, and then we use the resource constraint to de-
termine the equilibrium level of cA. Define the function
′h(m; c )p [U(c ) U(m)] U (c )(c  g m). (7)A A A A
This function measures the net gain to a household from switching
from being an inactive household with consumption m to an active
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household with consumption cA. Note that this measure of the net gain
is simple and static, with only current variables; it is not dynamic. This
simplicity stems from our assumption that the cash-in-advance constraint
binds, so that a household’s decision to pay the fixed cost in period t
does not affect its real balances and consumption in future periods.
The first two terms on the right side of (7) measure the direct utility
gain within the current period from the household’s switch from in-
activity to activity, and the third term measures the utility cost of the
required transfer of real balances from the asset market. With cA fixed,
it is optimal for a household with real balances m to trade cash and
bonds and consume cA if h is positive and not to trade and instead
consume m if h is negative. Note that h is strictly convex in the argument
m; it attains its minimum at and is negative at this minimum ifmp cA
Thus h typically crosses zero twice.g 1 0.
Define low and high cutoffs for trade, and as they (c , m) y (c , m),L A H A
solutions to
y
h ; c p 0 (8)A( )m
when both of these solutions exist. If (7) is negative for all thenm ! c ,A
set ; if it is negative for all then sety (c , m)p 0 m 1 c , y (c , m)p .L A A H A
This cutoff rule is illustrated in figure 2. Note that as the fixed cost g
goes to zero, and converge to cA, so that all house-y (c , m)/m y (c , m)/mL A H A
holds become active.
Given this form for the zones of activity and inactivity, we use the
resource constraint to determine the equilibrium values of active house-
holds’ consumption and corresponding cutoffs. Together, the cash-in-
advance constraint and constraints (5) and (6) imply that the price level
is the inflation rate is real money holdingst tP(m )p M(m )/Y, p p m ,t t
are and the consumption of inactive householdst t1m(m , y )p y /m ,t1 t
is Substituting the inactive household’s consump-t t1c(m , y )p y /m .t1 t
tion into the resource constraint (5) and using the cutoff rule defined
in (8) gives
yH1
(c  g)[F(y ) 1 F(y )] yf(y)dyp Y, (9)A L H 
mt yL
where we have suppressed the explicit dependence of cA, yH, and yL on
mt. Clearly, these cutoff points and consumption levels of active house-
holds depend only on mt, whereas the consumption level of inactive
households depends only on (mt, ).yt1
If we fix and use (8) to solve for yL and yH as functions of cA,m ≥ 1t
we see that the left side of (9) is continuous and strictly monotonic in
cA. Thus any solution to the equations for the equilibrium values of
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Fig. 2.—Cutoff rule defining zones of activity and inactivity
active households’ consumption and cutoffs is unique. These arguments
give the following proposition. (For details, see App. A.)
Proposition 1. The equilibrium consumption of households is given
by
yt1
if y  (y (m ), y (m ))t1 L t H t
mtt t1c(m , y )p {
c (m ) otherwise,A t
where the functions and are the solutions to (8) andy (m), y (m), c (m)L H A
(9).
In our analysis of asset prices, we can use the sequence of budget
constraints (3) to substitute out for the household’s bond holdings and
replace these constraints with a single period 0 constraint on household
transfers of cash between the goods and asset markets. As we show in
Appendix A, period 0 nominal asset prices are determined by the first-
order condition for active households:
t ′ t t tb U (c (m ))g(m )p lQ(m )P(m ), (10)A t
where l is the Lagrange multiplier on households’ period 0 budget
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constraint and Q(mt) is the price in dollars in the asset market in period
0 for a dollar delivered in the asset market in period t in state mt. Since
all households are identical in period 0, the multipliers in the Lagran-
gian are the same for all of them.
In what follows, we suppress reference to the state mt and write the
price of an n-period bond that costs dollars in period t and pays $1.00nqt
in all states in period ast n
′U (c ) PAtn tn nq p b E . (11)t t ′U (c ) PAt tn
There is a key difference between this formula and the one that arises
in the standard cash-in-advance model. In the standard model, the rel-
evant marginal utility for asset pricing is that of the representative house-
hold, and the corresponding consumption is aggregate consumption.
Here, the relevant marginal utility for asset pricing in period t is that
of the active households in period t and that expected for them in
period These marginal utilities in periods t and are not thoset n. t n
of any single household, but rather those of whichever households hap-
pen to be active in those periods. This distinction is critical for the
results that follow.
III. Asset Prices
Now we develop the economy’s links between money injections and
asset prices. The link introduced with market segmentation is how an
active household’s consumption responds to a money injection. We start
with this link and then develop formulas for asset prices.
A. Money Injections and Consumption
We develop sufficient conditions for a money injection to raise the
consumption of active households. We begin with a discrete example
and follow with a continuous example.
Consider first a simple example in which y takes on three values,
with probabilities f0, f1, and f2, respectively. We conjecturey ! y ! y ,0 1 2
an equilibrium in which, when money growth is households with them,¯
central value of the endowment y1 choose not to trade and those with
low and high endowments y0 and y2 do choose to trade. Under this
conjecture, for money growth shocks m close to we know from them,¯
resource constraint that each active household consumes an equal share
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of the active households’ aggregate endowment plus the inflation tax
levied on inactive households minus the fixed cost, or from (9),
y f  y f 1 y f0 0 2 2 1 1
c (m)p  1  g. (12)A ( )f  f m f  f0 2 0 2
The corresponding cutoffs and are found fromy (c (m), m) y (c (m), m)L A H A
(8). This conjecture is valid as long as
y ! y (c (m), m) ! y ! y (c (m), m) ! y .¯ ¯ ¯ ¯0 L A 1 H A 2
Clearly, an increase in the money growth rate m raises the inflation
tax levied on each inactive household’s real balances. In equilibrium,
asset prices adjust to redistribute these inflation tax revenues to active
households. In this example, the number of active households does not
vary with the money injection, so the consumption of each active house-
hold increases. Specifically,
d log c (y f )/mA 1 1
p , (13)
d logm c ( f  f )A 0 2
which is the ratio of the total consumption of inactive households to
that of active households.
Now consider an example in which y has a continuous density. Here,
as before, an increase in the money injection reduces beginning of
period real balances for every household. But now with a continuous
density of these real balances across households, some households switch
zones. Because inflation has reduced real balances, the initially inactive
households near the lower cutoff yL find it optimal to pay the fixed cost
and become active, whereas the initially active households near the
upper cutoff yH find it optimal not to pay the fixed cost and become
inactive. Both of these switches tend to reduce the level of active house-
holds’ consumption. Intuitively, active households as a group pool their
real balances and have equal consumption. Inactive households that
become active bring lower than average real balances to this group,
whereas active households that become inactive take away higher than
average real balances. As long as the fraction of households near these
cutoffs is not too large, the consumption of active households increases
with a money injection.
This content downloaded from 144.082.115.101 on August 13, 2018 19:56:01 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
88 journal of political economy
More formally, differentiating (8) and (9) gives
yL
[F(y ) 1 F(y )] mf(y ) c  g hL H L A L( ){ m
y dcH A
 mf(y ) c  g h (14)H A H( ) }m dm
yH1 y y y y yL L H H
p f(y)dy  c  g f(y )  c  g f(y ) , A L A H( ) ( )m m m m m myL
where
c  g (y /m)A i′′h p U (c ) .i A ′ ′[ ]U (c ) U (y /m)A i
From (7) and (8) we know that Thus hH and hLy /m ! c ! (y /m) g.L A H
are positive, and so is the term in braces on the left side of (14). On
the right side of (14), the first term is positive and the last two terms
are negative, so without further restrictions, the sign of the right side
is ambiguous. The first term measures the effect of the inflation tax on
the consumption of inactive households when the zone of inactivity is
held fixed. The last two terms measure the change in the consumption
of inactive households that results from a change in the zone of inac-
tivity. The fraction of households at the lower edge of the zonef(y )L
with real balances become active, and the fraction of house-y /m f(y )L H
holds at the upper edge of the zone with real balances becomey /mH
inactive. As long as the fraction of households at these edges is not too
large, the consumption of active households increases.
In Appendix B, we give an example in which is positivedc /d logmA
and y has a lognormal distribution. Examples can, of course, also be
constructed in which the fraction of households at the edges of the
zone is large and an increase in money growth decreases the consump-
tion of active households. Here, though, we focus on what we consider
the standard case when the opposite holds.
B. Money Injections and Asset Prices
We now turn to the link between money injections and asset prices. In
order to get analytical results, we make several assumptions. Let the log
of money growth in period t be normally distributed and have constant
conditional variance over time. Let be defined bym logmp E logm ,¯ ¯ t
where E is the unconditional expectation. Let where1jU(c)p c /(1 j),
the risk aversion parameter Let denote the consumption of¯j 1 0. cA
active households when money growth is equal to To a first-orderm.¯
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approximation, the log of an active household’s marginal utility is given
by





evaluated at The parameter f is the elasticity of an active house-mp m.¯
hold’s marginal utility with respect to a money injection. Given these
assumptions, we shall analyze the relation between money and interest
rates.
IV. Interest Rate Dynamics
Now we illustrate the dynamics of money injections, expected inflation,
and interest rates. We first show that the model can produce the negative
relation between expected inflation and real interest rates noted by Barr
and Campbell (1997). We then give conditions under which the effect
of money injections on real interest rates dominates their effect on
expected inflation, so that money injections have liquidity effects.
We work out the model’s implications for the dynamics of the interest
rate term structure for two common processes for money growth and
inflation: an autoregressive process and a long-memory process. We begin
with the autoregressive process because it is simple and generates the
well-known Vasicek (1977) model for the dynamics of the term structure.
Moreover, according to Christiano et al. (1998), first-order autoregres-
sive processes do a good job of approximating the responses of money
growth and interest rates to a money shock. Using a different VAR,
however, Cochrane (1994) has found a more protracted response for
money growth to a money shock. Motivated by this finding, we study a
process for money growth with impulse responses that decay more slowly
than those of a first-order autoregressive process. For simplicity, we con-
sider a long-memory process. We show that with such a process, a money
injection leads to a fall in the short-term nominal rate followed by a
rise. We show that the shock also twists the yield curve: on impact, short
rates fall and long rates rise. At least since Friedman (1968), economists
have argued that money injections have these effects on interest rates.
Moreover, Cochrane has found such a response for interest rates in his
VAR.
Throughout the following analysis, money injections have two effects
on nominal interest rates: an expected inflation effect and a segmentation
effect, as can be seen from the Fisher equation: where iˆ ˆ ˆı p r  E p ,t t t t1
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is the nominal interest rate and r is the real interest rate. (Here and
elsewhere, a caret over a character denotes a log deviation.) Using a
log-linear approximation to (11), we can express the expected inflation
effect as
ˆ ˆE p p E m . (16)t t1 t t1
This holds because in the model, both output and velocity are constant,
so expected inflation is simply expected money growth. Similarly, we
can express the segmentation effect as
′ ′
̂ ̂ˆ ˆ ˆr p U (c ) E U (c )p f(E m  m ), (17)t At t At+1 t t1 t
where and are the effects of the money injection on theˆ ˆfm fE mt t t1
active households’ marginal utility in periods t and t 1.
In the standard model, so and real interest rates aregp 0, fp 0
constant. In our model, so ; thus a money growth shock thatg 1 0, f 1 0
increases mt also increases the consumption of active households in t
and drives down their marginal utility in t. If the money growth shock
raises expected money growth in as well, then it raises expectedt 1
consumption and lowers expected marginal utility for active households
in As long as the money growth process is mean reverting, so thatt 1.
is decreasing in an increase in money growth drives downˆ ˆ ˆE m  m m ,t t1 t t
real interest rates. With such processes, the model reproduces the neg-
ative relation between expected inflation and real rates found by Barr
and Campbell (1997), since a money injection drives expected inflation
up and real rates down.
Our model produces liquidity effects when the segmentation effect
(17) dominates the expected inflation effect (16). The overall magni-
tude of the segmentation effect depends on two parameters: the elas-
ticity of the marginal utility of active households with respect to money
growth f and the persistence of a money growth shock as measured by
The segmentation effect increases the higher f is, that is,ˆ ˆE m  m .t t1 t
the more responsive an active household’s marginal utility is to a money
injection. This effect is smaller the greater the persistence of money
growth. If money growth is temporary, then a given money injection
will lead to a temporary increase in active households’ consumption
and, hence, to a relatively large drop in the real interest rate. As the
shock to money growth becomes more persistent, a given money injec-
tion leads to a more permanent increase in active households’ con-
sumption and, hence, to a smaller drop in the real interest rate.
We turn now to an analysis of the two common processes for money
growth and inflation.
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A. Example 1: Autoregressive Process
Assume that money injections satisfy where r is theˆ ˆm p rm  e ,t1 t t1
persistence of the money shock and is a normal, i.i.d. innovationet1
with mean zero and variance The expected inflation effect is given2j .e
by and the segmentation effect is given by ˆˆ ˆE p p rm , r p f(rt t1 t t
so that As long as money growth is meanˆˆ ˆ1)m i p [f(r 1) r]m .t t t
reverting, so that expected inflation and real rates move in ther ! 1,
opposite direction. Notice that if
r
f 1 , (18)
1 r
then the segmentation effect dominates the expected inflation effect,
and a money injection leads to a fall in nominal interest rates on impact.
Consider next the dynamics of the short-term interest rate. Since
and we have that Thus realk k kˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆE p p r E p E r p r r , E i p r i .t tk1 t t1 t tk t t tk t
and nominal interest rates have the same persistence as money shocks.
If (18) holds, then a money injection leads nominal rates to initially
fall and decay back to zero at rate r. Clearly, these liquidity effects are
persistent whenever money shocks are persistent.
Consider the effects on the yield curve. In our model, the dynamics
of the term structure satisfies the expectations hypothesis with a constant
risk premium: movements in long-term rates are an average of movements
in expected future short-term rates. In fact, this is true for any log-linear
model with constant conditional variances. When (18) holds, so that
the segmentation effect dominates the expected inflation effect, a
money injection lowers the shorter yields by more than the longer yields
and thus steepens the yield curve. Each yield follows an autoregressive
process and returns to its mean value at rate r. For this example, then,
our general equilibrium model generates the dynamics of the term
structure summarized by the Vasicek (1977) model. (Of course, there
is substantial evidence that the expectations hypothesis is a poor ap-
proximation of the dynamics of the term structure; see Campbell, Lo,
and MacKinlay [1997]. Addressing that problem, however, is beyond
our scope here.)
Consider the magnitude of f required for liquidity effects for this
autoregressive example. Christiano et al. (1998) argue that the impulse
response for M2 growth following a money shock is well approximated
by an autoregressive process with With this persistence, (18)rp .5.
implies that the model produces liquidity effects for Getting af ≥ 1.
handle on the level of segmentation in the data is harder. To get a rough
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feel for what different levels of f entail, note that combining the formula
from our discrete example (13) with equation (15) gives
total consumption of inactive households
fp j . (19)
total consumption of active households
Consider In order to interpret this value, we need to take a standfp 2.
on the risk aversion parameter j. The literature uses a wide range of
estimates for j. The business cycle literature commonly uses butjp 2,
estimates easily range as high as With (19) implies thatjp 8. jp 2,
we need half of the households to be not actively trading money for
interest-bearing assets in any given period in order to generate fp
With we need only one-fifth of the households to be inactive2. jp 8,
in order to get fp 2.
We illustrate the model’s predictions in figure 3. In figure 3a, we
graph the impulse responses to a money shock of money growth and
(annualized) short-term nominal interest rates with The re-fp 2.
sponses are similar to those found by Christiano et al. using M2. In
figure 3b, we graph the yield curves at three different times: at the time
of the shock’s impact, one quarter after the shock, and three quarters
after the shock. These responses show the yield curve steepening on
impact and then reverting slowly to its normal position. Since interest
rates in the model satisfy the expectations hypothesis, the impulse re-
sponse plot for the short-term rate completely determines the dynamics
of yields of long maturities. (Actually, the impulse response of isˆE it tk
the response of the one-period forward rate of maturity k in period t,
and the yields are just averages of the forward rates.) So the two plots
in figure 3 are just two ways to summarize the same information.
So far, we have worked out relations between money injections and
interest rates for a simple first-order autoregressive process for money
growth. In that example, a money injection either lowers interest rates
at all maturities or raises them at all maturities. This pattern is not a
general feature of our model, but rather results from the special nature
of a first-order autoregressive process.
To illustrate the implications of our model more generally, we develop
these relations when money growth has a general moving average rep-
resentation where the shocks are independent andmˆ p  v e , ejp0t j tj tj
In this case, equations (16) and (17), characterizing the impact2N(0, j ).e
of money injections on expected inflation and the real interest rate,
become and Accordingly, ˆˆE p p  v e r p f (v  v)e .jp1 jp0t t1 j t1j t j1 j tj
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Fig. 3.—How our model responds to a money shock: Patterns implied by an autore-
gressive process. a, Impulse responses of short-term nominal interest rates and money
growth. b, Interest rate yield curve on shock’s impact and one and three quarters later.
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the impulse responses of expected inflation and the real interest rate
following a monetary shock et in period t are given by
ˆE p p v e ,t tk1 k1 t
ˆE r p f(v  v )e .t tk k1 k t
In general, then, the strength of the expected inflation effect following
a monetary shock depends on the level of these moving average coef-
ficients vk, and the strength of the segmentation effect depends on the
difference of these moving average coefficients. Thus a money(v  v )k1 k
injection can cause interest rates to fall at some horizons and rise at
other horizons. In particular, a positive money injection et lowers the
expected nominal interest rate at ift k
v  f(v  v ) ! 0. (20)k1 k1 k
When money injections are a first-order autoregressive process, v pk
and (20) reduces to (18). In this case, money injections either lowerkr
interest rates at all horizons k or raise them at all horizons. Intuitively,
this happens because when the moving average coefficients decay geo-
metrically, the relative strengths of the segmentation effect and the
expected inflation effect are the same at all horizons.
At least since Friedman (1968), economists have argued that money
injections lead to an initial decline in short-term interest rates followed
by a rise. If money injections are a moving average process in which the
coefficients vk decline rapidly at first and more slowly later, then (20)
implies that the segmentation effect is relatively stronger at shorter
horizons and relatively weaker at longer horizons. Thus a money injec-
tion with such moving average coefficients can lead to an initial decline
in nominal interest rates followed by a subsequent rise. We next provide
a simple parametric example illustrating this point.
B. Example 2: Long-Memory Process
Consider the moving average process where vj are themˆ p  v e ,jp0t j tj
moving average coefficients and et is a white-noise process. The long-
memory process is a moving average process in which the coefficients
satisfy the recursion
1 d
v p 1 vj j1( )j
for and and the are independent and distributed1 1j ≥ 1  ! d ! , etj2 2
The parameter d controls the rate of decay of the moving2N(0, j ).e
average coefficients. These coefficients decay at a rate For(1 d)/j ! 1.
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large j, this rate approaches zero, which is the source of the long
memory.
Using (16) and (17), we can show that the short-term nominal interest
rate whereˆ i p  a e ,jp1t j t1j
1 d 1 d
a p f  1 v .j j1( )[ ]j j
Here, in the brackets, the first term is the segmentation effect and the
second is the expected inflation effect. Since the coefficients vj are all
positive, for large enough j the expected inflation effect must dominate
the segmentation effect, and aj must be positive. If then,f 1 d/(1 d),
for the segmentation effect outweighs the expected inflation ef-jp 1,
fect; so for small j, aj is negative. If we ignore integers, we see that aj
goes from negative to positive at Notice that the∗j p (1 f)(1 d).
more segmented the market, the longer the period in which the seg-
mentation effect outweighs the expected inflation effect.
We illustrate the pattern implied by the long-memory process with
and in figure 4. In figure 4a, we see that the nominal rate1dp fp 2
4
drops on the money shock’s impact and then rises in the third quarter
after the shock. Interestingly, this pattern is similar to that estimated by
Cochrane (1998), which he argues is representative of results in the
VAR literature. In figure 4b, we plot the yield curves on impact, one
quarter after the shock, and three quarters after the shock. In this figure,
we see that on impact, the money growth shock twists the yield curve,
lowering short yields and raising long ones. After several quarters, short
yields rise and all yields slowly move back to their average values.
The different responses of nominal interest rates to a money injection,
shown in figures 3 and 4, stem from the different patterns of the moving
average coefficients implied by the two processes for money growth. In
figure 5 we plot these moving average coefficients. As we have discussed,
with the autoregressive process, these coefficients decline geometrically,
and the relative strengths of the segmentation effect and the expected
inflation effect are the same at all horizons; thus the impulse response
of nominal interest rates has the same sign at all horizons. Relative to
the moving average coefficients of the autoregressive process, those of
the long-memory process decline more rapidly at first and more slowly
later. From (20) we see that such a pattern leads nominal interest rates
to decline at first and then rise later.
V. Exchange Rates
Having demonstrated that our segmented market model can reproduce
the major observed interest rate responses to money injections, we turn
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Fig. 4.—How our model responds to a money shock: Patterns implied by a long-memory
process. a, Impulse responses of short-term nominal interest rates and money growth. b,
Interest rate yield curve on shock’s impact and one and three quarters later.
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Fig. 5.—Moving average coefficients: autoregressive and long-memory processes
now to exchange rates. Here the features we want to reproduce are
different for countries with different rates of inflation. In low-inflation
countries, real and nominal exchange rates have similar volatility, are
highly correlated, and are persistent (see Mussa [1986] and our table
1 below). In high-inflation countries, nominal exchange rates are sub-
stantially more volatile than real exchange rates (see fig. 7, discussed
below). The standard model cannot reproduce these observations. We
develop a two-country version of our segmented markets economy that
can.
A. A Two-Country Economy
First we develop a more sophisticated representation of monetary policy
than we used in the one-country model. Earlier we explored the im-
plications of the one-country model only for the impulse responses to
exogenous money shocks. Here we explore the model’s predictions for
some unconditional moments of the data, so we need to take a firmer
stand on the policy rule followed by the monetary authority. As we
document below, in the data, nominal interest rates are substantially
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more persistent than money growth rates. To capture this, we model
money growth as the sum of an exogenous component and an endog-
enous component that offsets a type of money demand shock.
Consider now a two-country, cash-in-advance economy that extends
the work of Lucas (1982). We refer to one country as the home country
and the other as the foreign country. For simplicity, we abstract from
trade in goods across countries by having the households in each country
desire only the local good. Specifically, households in the home country
use the home currency, called dollars, to purchase a home good. House-
holds in the foreign country use the foreign currency, called euros, to
purchase a foreign good. In the asset market, households trade the two
currencies and dollar and euro bonds that promise delivery of the rel-
evant currency in the asset market in the next period, and the two
governments introduce their currencies via open market operations. As
before, each transfer of cash between the asset market and any individual
household in either goods market has a real fixed cost of g. Households
in the home country choose to transfer only the home currency, and
those in the foreign country choose to transfer only the foreign currency.
In the asset market, however, households may choose to hold their
wealth in bonds denominated in either currency, and as a result, the
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the prices of bonds
denominated in the two currencies is consistent with the standard (cov-
ered) interest rate parity conditions.
In order to generate a type of money demand shock, we allow shocks
to the distribution of idiosyncratic endowments in the two countries.
The densities of the endowments are now given by andf(y; h )t
where ht and are i.i.d. shocks, both with mean Thus the
∗ ∗ ∗f(y ; h ), h h.¯t t
aggregate shock is and is its history.∗ ∗ ts p (m , m , h , h ), s p (s , … , s )t t t t t 1 t
Let denote the density of the probability distribution over suchtg(s )
histories.
We let home households trade a complete set of dollar-denominated
claims with a world intermediary, and we let foreign households similarly
trade euro-denominated claims. The home government’s bonds are dol-
lar bonds, and its budget constraint is (1) as before. The foreign gov-
ernment’s bonds are euro bonds, and its budget constraint is the obvious
analogue. The world intermediary buys both dollar- and euro-denom-
inated government bonds and trades in both dollar and euro household-
specific contingent claims in order to maximize profits for each aggre-
gate state Lack of arbitrage across currencies implies thatt1s .
Here q and are the prices for one-t ∗ t t t1 ∗q(s , s )p q (s , s )e(s )/e(s ). qt1 t1
period dollar and euro bonds and e is the nominal exchange rate in
terms of dollars per euro. We use this relationship to solve for move-
ments in nominal exchange rates.
To solve for the period 0 nominal exchange rate e0, we need to choose
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the initial conditions carefully. In period 0, home households have B¯h
units of the home government debt and units of the foreign gov-∗B¯h
ernment debt, which are claims on dollars and euros in the asset∗¯ ¯B Bh h
market in that period. In period 0, there is no trade in goods; households
simply trade bonds. Likewise, foreign households start period 0 with
units of the home government debt and units of the foreign∗¯ ¯B Bf f
government debt in the asset market. We require that and¯ ¯ ¯B  B p Bh f
where is the initial stock of home government debt in∗ ∗ ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯B  B p B , Bh f
dollars and is the initial stock of foreign government debt in euros.∗B¯
The constraints for the home households are the same as before
except that now, in period 0, (3) is given by
∗¯ ¯B  e B p q(s )B(s , y )f(y )ds dy .h 0 h   1 1 0 0 1 0
s y1 0
The constraints for the foreign households are the obvious analogues,
with the foreign households having initial assets of in euros∗¯ ¯(B /e ) Bf 0 f
in period 0. The resource constraint for the home good and the money
market–clearing conditions for dollars are similar to those in (5) and
(6), except that the distribution of endowments is now indexed by the
current realization ht. Analogous constraints hold for the foreign good
and euros.
In equilibrium, the period 0 nominal exchange rate ¯e p (B0
To see this, iterate on (1) and (3) for the home household, and∗¯ ¯B )/B .h h
take limits to show that Clearly, this exchange rate0 ∗¯ ¯ ¯Bp B  e(s )B .h h
exists and is positive as long as and or0 ∗¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯e p e(s ) B ! B B 1 0 B 1 B0 h h h
and ∗B¯ ! 0.h
The equilibrium consumption of households in the home country is
similar to that described in proposition 1. Specifically, the cutoff rule
for trade is the same, but (9) is replaced by
yH1
(c  g)[F(y ; h ) 1 F(y ; h )] yf(y; h )dyp Y, (21)A L t H t  t
mt yL
so that the equilibrium consumption of active home households is given
by The analogous result holds for households in the foreignc (m ; h ).A t t
country. This implies that active household consumption in the two
countries responds only to injections of the local currency and the local
shock to endowments.
To develop the asset pricing formulas for this two-country economy,
recall from (10) that period 0 nominal dollar asset prices are giventQ(s )
by the marginal utility of a dollar for active home households. Likewise,
period 0 euro asset prices are given by the analogous marginal∗ tQ (s )
utility for active foreign households. Arbitrage requires that nominal
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exchange rates satisfy We define the real exchanget ∗ t te(s )p e Q (s )/Q(s ).0
rate as which is then given byt t ∗ t tx(s )p e(s )P (s )/P(s ),
′ ∗ ∗ ∗l U (c (m ; h ))A t ttx(s )p e . (22)0 ∗ ′l U (c (m ; h ))A t t
Since and the nominal exchange ratet t ∗ t ∗ tP(s )p M(s )/Y P (s )p M (s )/Y,
is In period t in aggregate state state-contin-t t t ∗ t te(s )p x(s )M(s )/M (s ). s ,
gent dollar bond prices are given by (11), and likewise for state-contin-
gent euro bond prices.
B. Exchange Rates with Low Inflation
Now we describe a process for monetary policy relevant for low-inflation
countries and derive the model’s implications for the volatility and per-
sistence of exchange rates.
In the data, interest rates are much more persistent than money
growth. Yet recall from example 1 that in the simple model with only
money shocks, interest rates and money growth are equally persistent.
A simple way to address this discrepancy between the data and the simple
model is to assume that part of monetary policy is exogenous and per-
sistent, whereas another part is endogenous and offsets transient money
demand shocks. The endogenous part essentially adds a transient com-
ponent to money growth that does not appear in interest rates.
In our two-country model, therefore, we assume that the monetary
authority follows an interest rate policy of the form Itˆ ˆi p ri  e .t1 t t1
implements this policy rule by choosing money growth to be the sum
of two components:
ˆ ˆm p m  v(m , h ), (23)t 1t 1t t
where m1t is the exogenous part of monetary policy that follows an au-
toregressive process and is the endogenousˆ ˆm p rm  e , v(m , h )1t1 1t mt1 1t t
part of monetary policy that offsets the shock ht to endowments. Thus
solves so that, in equilibrium, thev(m , h ) c (m  v; h )p c (m ; h),¯1t t A 1t t A 1t
consumption of active households does not respond to the shock ht.
Clearly, In what follows, we suppress all referencesv(m , h)/m p 0.¯1 1
to and instead write the consumption of active households ash¯
We assume that foreign money growth is set in a similar way andc (m ).A 1t
that the shocks to both the exogenous and endogenous parts of foreign
monetary policy are independent of those to home monetary policy.
To a first-order approximation, the log of v is given by Theˆ ˆv p kh .t t
log of the marginal utility of consumption for active home households
is given as before, with f defined as in (15), with m1 replacing m. The
reason is that the endogenous part of monetary policy simply offsets
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the impact of the shock vt to endowments on the consumption of active
households. The real interest rate thus depends only on the exogenous
part of monetary policy, and In contrast, inflation andˆ ˆr p f(r 1)m .t 1t
money growth depend on both components and are given by pˆ pt1
ˆˆ ˆm p m  kh .t1 1t1 t1
To see that the money growth rate rule in (23) implements the as-
sumed interest rate rule, note that since the nominal in-ˆE p p rm ,t t1 1t
terest rate is
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆi p r  E p p [f(r 1) r]m .t t t t1 1t
Thus the serial correlation of the nominal interest rate is equal to that
of the exogenous part of monetary policy, namely r. The serial corre-
lation of inflation is lower than r because of the i.i.d. component from
money demand shocks.
Consider the implications of this model for the behavior of real
exchange rates. Equation (22) implies that
∗ ∗
ˆ ˆ ˆx p fm  f m , (24)t 1t 1t
where is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption of active∗f
foreign households with respect to a foreign money injection. Clearly,
then, the more segmented a market is, the greater the volatility of real
exchange rates. Moreover, the persistence of real exchange rates is de-
termined by the persistence of the interest rate rule.
To get a feel for the quantitative implications of the model, consider
a simple numerical example. We set which is the serial cor-rp .95,
relation of the U.S. federal funds rate on a quarterly basis (1960:1–1999:
3). Note that here the unconditional persistence of the federal funds
rate is much higher than the conditional response of that rate following
a money shock as estimated by Christiano et al. (1998). They argue that
the monetary authority sets interest rates as a function of some other
variables in the economy that are very persistent. Here we abstract from
those other variables, so we simply make the interest rates follow a highly
persistent AR(1) process.
We choose k std so that the serial correlation of money growth isˆ(h)
.75, which is the serial correlation of quarterly M2 growth (1960:1–1999:
3). We assume symmetry across countries, so that and we assume∗fp f ,
that shocks are independent across countries. We simulate the model
for 120 time periods, Hodrick-Prescott-filter the data, and consider the
mean values of several statistics over 50 simulations.
In figure 6, we plot against f three statistics based on these simula-
tions: the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate relative to
that of the real exchange rate, the correlation ofstd(log e)/std(log x),
the real and nominal exchange rates, and the serialcorr(log e, log x),
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Fig. 6.—The model’s exchange rate statistics vs. the segmentation parameter
correlation (or persistence) of the real exchange rate, corr(log x,
We see that as f becomes large, the volatility of the reallog x ).1
exchange rate becomes closer to that of the nominal exchange rate,
and the correlation of the real and nominal rates grows. We also see
that real exchange rates essentially inherit the persistence of nominal
interest rates regardless of f.
In table 1 we report on these same three statistics for a number of
low-inflation countries. Comparing figure 6 to table 1, we see that as
the segmentation parameter is increased to six, the relative volatility
and the correlation of nominal and real exchange rates in the model
begin to approach one, the level that both approximate in the data.
The persistence of real exchange rates in the model is similar to that
in the data (around .8) for any value of the segmentation parameter.
The numbers in this example are useful to give a feel for how the
model works with a moderate amount of segmentation. To interpret
these levels of the segmentation parameter f, recall the calculation from
our discrete example given in equation (19) that f is equal to the utility
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TABLE 1
Exchange Rates in Low-Inflation Countries: Quarterly, 1970:1–1999:3
Country








Canada 5.2 .96 .93 .79
France 5.9 1.06 .99 .78
Germany 3.4 1.01 .98 .76
Italy 9.0 1.10 .98 .79
Japan 4.0 1.00 .98 .79
United Kingdom 7.5 1.06 .97 .78
Source.—International Monetary Fund.
* Based on a consumer price index.
curvature parameter j times the ratio of the total consumption of in-
active households to the total consumption of active households. If we
assume that roughly half of the households are inactive in each period,
then values of f ranging from two to six as illustrated in figure 6 cor-
respond to values of j ranging from two to six, all well within the range
of available estimates of this parameter. Clearly, to do a more complete
comparison between the model and the data, we would need to include
real shocks, which would raise the volatility of real exchange rates.
C. Exchange Rates with High Inflation
Now we shift to high-inflation countries. We first document that in high-
inflation countries, the volatility of nominal exchange rates is substan-
tially greater than that of real exchange rates, whereas in low-inflation
countries, these volatilities are similar. This difference is obvious in fig-
ure 7, which displays the ratio of the standard deviations of the nominal
and real exchange rates based on Hodrick-Prescott-filtered data for 49
countries.1 In this subsection, we discuss how the degree of market
segmentation, as measured by the parameter f, varies with the average
rate of money growth. In particular, we show that if the average rate of
inflation is high enough, almost all households choose to pay the fixed
cost, so that asset markets are no longer segmented. Thus, as inflation
1 We use the International Monetary Fund’s data from its publication International Fi-
nancial Statistics covering the period 1970:1–1999:3 for the following countries: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. For each country, we use the bilateral nom-
inal exchange rate and the consumer price index–based bilateral real exchange rate with
the United States.
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Fig. 7.—Relative volatility of nominal and real exchange rates vs. inflation: ratio of
standard deviations of nominal and real exchange rates vs. mean of log of consumer price
index changes in 41 selected countries, 1970:1–1999:3. The cluster of countries with low
relative volatility of nominal and real exchange rates and low inflation includes Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the
United Kingdom. Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
becomes high enough, the volatility of real exchange rates becomes
much smaller than that of nominal exchange rates.
For simplicity, consider again an example in which y takes on three
values, with probabilities f0, f1, and f2, respectively, and holdy ! y ! y ,0 1 2
the money demand shock h constant. Consider the degree of segmen-
tation in a country with low average inflation and in a country withm¯A
high average inflation For the low-inflation country, assume thatm .¯B
y ! y (c (m ), m ) ! y ! y (c (m ), m ) ! y .¯ ¯ ¯ ¯0 L A A A 1 H A A A 2
This content downloaded from 144.082.115.101 on August 13, 2018 19:56:01 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
money 105
With a utility function of the form 1jU(c)p c /(1 j),
d log c j(y f )/m¯A 1 1 A
fp j p . (25)
d logm c ( f  f )A 0 2
For the high-inflation country, we proceed as follows. Under an as-
sumption that households’ utility is sufficiently curved, we can show that
there exists a high enough inflation rate such that all households pay
the fixed cost. More formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the support of y is bounded by andy¯
that Then a sufficiently high inflation rate exists such1 j ! (Y g)/Y.
that all households are active and fp 0.
Proof. Let be the solution to We firstx  [0, Y g] h(x; Y g)p 0.L
show that, under our assumption on j, this solution with exists.x 1 0L
Then we show that when all households choose to pay the¯m 1 y/x ,¯B L
fixed cost to trade.
To show that we need to show that there is a solution tox 1 0,L
in the interval Recall that is min-h(x; Y g)p 0 (0, Y g). h(x; Y g)
imized at and is negative at this point. Thus we need showxp Y g
only that The condition on j ensures that this inequalityh(0; Y g) 1 0.
holds. Note that if that condition is violated.h(0; Y g) ≤ 0
To see that all households choose to trade when observe¯m 1 y/x ,¯B L
that that and solve (7) and (9), andc p Y g, y p x m y p x m¯ ¯A L L B H H B
that Thus we know that traders’ consumption does not depend¯y 1 y.L
on money growth m and Q.E.D.fp 0.
Proposition 2 implies that as inflation becomes sufficiently high, the
segmentation effect diminishes and real exchange rates become much
less volatile than nominal exchange rates. One can construct examples
in which the segmentation parameter f declines smoothly with m. In
this sense, our model can generate the pattern in the data documented
in figure 7.
VI. Conclusion
We have developed a model in the spirit of Baumol (1952) and Tobin
(1956) that captures the idea that when a government injects money
through an open market operation, only a fraction of the households
in the economy are on the other side of the transaction; hence, money
injections have segmentation effects in addition to their standard Fish-
erian effects. We have deliberately kept the model simple to allow an
analytical solution. We have shown that this model generates features
of the data that standard models do not: a negative relation between
expected inflation and real interest rates and, with moderate amounts
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of segmentation, both persistent liquidity effects and volatile and per-
sistent exchange rates.
In order to generate volatile real exchange rates, a model needs fric-
tions in both the goods and asset markets (see, e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan, in press). Here we abstract from frictions in the goods mar-
ket, such as sticky prices (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995), in order to
focus on frictions in the asset market. Our work thus complements work
on goods market frictions and highlights a potentially important com-
ponent of a complete model of exchange rates with frictions in both
types of markets.
Our model also breaks the links between either asset prices or the
real exchange rate and aggregate consumption. This feature makes it
a promising alternative to the standard representative agent models.
Those models typically exhibit the consumption–real exchange rate anomaly;
namely, they predict that the correlation between the real exchange
rate and relative consumptions across countries should be close to one.
In the data this correlation varies greatly across countries and, if any-
thing, is closer to zero than to one (see Backus and Smith 1993; Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan, in press). Our model has the potential to gen-
erate volatile real exchange rates that have little relation to aggregate
consumption.
Appendix A
In this Appendix, we provide sufficient conditions to ensure that households
never carry over cash in either the goods market or the asset market.
To allow for the possibility that a household may hold cash, we modify the
household constraints as follows. In the goods markets, we denote unspent real
balances that the shopper might carry over from goods shopping by
We rewrite the constraint (2) ast t1a(m , y ).
t t1 t t1 t t1 t t1 t t1a(m , y )p m(m , y ) x(m , y )z(m , y ) c(m , y ). (A1)
We write new money balances as
t t t1P(m )[y  a(m , y )]tt1 tm(m , y )p t1P(m )
and add the cash-in-advance constraint In the asset market, wet t1a(m , y ) ≥ 0.
replace the budget constraints (3) with the sequence of budget constraints for
:t ≥ 1
t t1 t t t1B(m , y )p q(m , m )B(m , m , y , y )f(y )dm dy  t1 t1 t t t1 t
m yt1 t
t t1 t1 t2N(m , y )N(m , y )
t t t1 t t1 P(m )[x(m , y ) g]z(m , y ), (A2)
where is cash held over from the previous asset market andt1 t2N(m , y )
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is cash held over into the next asset market. Let andt t1 t t1N(m , y ) N(m , y ) ≥ 0
in period In period this asset market constraintt1 t2N(m , y )p N tp 1. tp 0,0
is Otherwise, the household’s problemB¯p q(m )B(m , y )f(y )dy dm N .∫ ∫m y 1 1 0 0 0 1 01 0
is unchanged.
We develop our sufficient conditions in several steps. We first characterize the
household’s optimal choice of c and x given prices and arbitrary rules for m, a,
and z and summarize these results in lemma 1. We then characterize the house-
hold’s trading rule z given an arbitrary rule for m and a and the optimal rules
for c and x, and we summarize these results in lemma 2. These lemmas complete
the proof of proposition 1 in the text. In lemma 3, we provide sufficient con-
ditions on the money growth process and the endowments process to ensure
that a and N are always zero.
Start by using the sequence of budget constraints (A2) to substitute out for
the household’s bond holdings. Replace these constraints with a single period
0 constraint on household transfers of cash between the goods and assetmarkets.
Any bounded allocation and bond holdings that satisfy (A2) also satisfy a period
0 budget constraint:

t t t t1 t t1Q(m ) {P(m )[x(m , y ) g]z(m , y ) 
t1tp0 y
t t1 t t2 t1 t1 t ¯N(m , y )N(m , y )}f(y )dy dm ≤ B. (A3)
Thus the household’s problem can be restated as follows. Choose real money
holdings m and a, trading rule z, consumption and transfers c and x, and cash
in the asset market N, subject to constraints (A1) and (A3) and the cash-in-
advance constraint.
Consider now a household’s optimal choice of consumption andt t1c(m , y )
transfers of dollar real balances given prices Q(mt) and P(mt), arbitraryt t1x(m , y )
feasible choices of real money holdings and and a tradingt t1 t t1m(m , y ) a(m , y ),
rule These choices maximize the Lagrangian corresponding to thet t1z(m , y ).
household’s problem. Let be the multiplier on (A1) and l be thet t1n(m , y )
multiplier on (A3). The first-order conditions corresponding to c and x, re-
spectively, are then given by
t ′ t t1 t t1 t t1b U (c(m , y ))g(m )f(y )p n(m , y )
and
t t t t1 t1 t t1 t t1lQ(m )P(m )z(m , y )f(y )p n(m , y )z(m , y ).
For those states such that these two first-order conditions implyt t1z(m , y )p 1,
that Since all households are identical int ′ t t1 t t tb U (c(m , y ))g(m )p lQ(m )P(m ).
period 0, the multipliers in the Lagrangian are the same for all households. We
summarize this discussion as follows.
Lemma 1. All households that choose to pay the fixed cost for a given aggregate
state mt have identical consumption for some function cA.
t t1 tc(m , y )p c (m )A
Households that choose not to pay the fixed cost have consumption
t t1 t t1 t t1c(m , y )p m(m , y ) a(m , y ).
Next consider a household’s optimal choice of whether to pay the fixed cost
to trade given prices Q(mt) and P(mt) and its arbitrary feasible choices of real
money holdings in the goods market and From lemmat t1 t t1m(m , y ) a(m , y ).
1, we have the form of the optimal consumption and transfer rules correspond-
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ing to the choices of and Substituting these rules into (4) and (A3)zp 1 zp 0.
gives the problem of choosing and to maximizet t t1c (m ) z(m , y )A

t t t t1 t t1 t t1b U(c (m ))z(m , y )g(m )f(y )dmdy   A
tp1

t t t1 t t1 t t1 t b U(m(m , y ) a(m , y ))[1 z(m , y )]g(m )  
tp1
t1 t t1# f(y )dmdy (A4)
subject to the constraint

t t t1 t1 t2 t1 t t1B¯ ≥ Q(m )[N(m , y )N(m , y )]f(y )dmdy 
tp1

t t t t t1 t t1 Q(m )P(m ){c (m ) g [m(m , y ) a(m , y )]}  A
tp1
t t1 t1 t t1# z(m , y )f(y )dmdy . (A5)
Let h denote the Lagrange multiplier on (A5), and consider the following
variational argument. For a state the increment to the Lagrangian oft t1(m , y ),
setting ist t1z(m , y )p 1
t t t t1 t tb U(c (m ))g(m )f(y ) hQ(m )P(m )A
t t t1 t t1 t1# {[c (m ) g] [m(m , y ) a(m , y )]}f(y ), (A6)A
which is simply the direct utility gain minus the cost of the requiredtU(c (m ))A
transfers. The increment to the Lagrangian of setting in this statet t1z(m , y )p 0
is
t t t1 t t1 t t1b U([m(m , y ) a(m , y )])g(m )f(y ), (A7)
which is simply the direct utility gain since there are no transfers. The first-order
condition with respect to cA is Subtracting (A7)
t ′ t t t tb U (c (m ))g(m )p hQ(m )P(m ).A
from (A6) and using the first-order condition when gives the cutoff ruleszp 1
defined by (8). More formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given active households’ consumption a household choosestc (m ),A
ift t1z(m , y )p 0
t ty (c (m ), m ) y (c (m ), m )L A t H A tt t1 t t1m(m , y ) a(m , y ) ,( )m mt t
and otherwise.t t1z(m , y )p 1
These lemmas complete the proof of proposition 1. To complete our asset
pricing formulas, we need to compute the equilibrium value of the multiplier
l. Given the equilibrium values of consumption computed in proposition 1, we
have that l solves
y (m )H t t ¯M(m ) y B
t ′ t tbU (c (m )) c (m ) g f(y)dyg(m )dm p . (A8) A t  A t[ ]Y m ltp1 y (m ) tL t
Households will not want to store cash in the asset market if nominal interest
rates are positive. Thus, to ensure that we need only check that nominalNp 0,
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interest rates are always positive. We now turn to the problem of developing
conditions sufficient to ensure that households never want to store cash in the
goods market.
Assume that households have constant relative risk aversion utility of the form
Let and be the prices constructed above when1j t tU(c)p c /(1 j). Q(m ) P(m )
a and N are assumed equal to zero.
Consider first the consumption of a household that deviates from the strategy
of never holding cash from one period to the next in the goods market. From
lemmas 1 and 2, we have that, with a fixed plan for holding casht t1{a (m , y )}t
in the goods market, this deviant household’s consumption choices are similar
to those of a household that does not hold cash in the goods market. In par-
ticular, in those states of nature in which the deviant chooses to pay the fixed
cost to trade, from lemma 1, the household’s consumption satisfies the first-
order condition where hd is the Lagrange mul-t ′ d t t d t tb U (c (m ))g(m )p h Q(m )P(m ),A
tiplier on this household’s period 0 budget constraint. Thus, in those states in
which the deviant household pays the fixed cost to trade, it equates its marginal
rate of substitution to that of other active households that do not deviate. Given
constant risk aversion, this implies that for all mt for some fixedd tc (m )p vc (m )A A t
factor of proportionality v. In those states of nature in which the deviant house-
hold does not choose to pay the fixed cost, its consumption is d t t1c (m , y )p
and its decision whether to pay the fixed cost is de-d t t1 d t t1m (m , y ) a (m , y ),
termined by the cutoffs and described in lemma 2.y (vc (m ), m ) y (vc (m ), m )L A t t H A t t
Since
d t1 t2y  a (m , y )t1d t t1m (m , y )p
mt
and, in the event that the deviant household pays the fixed cost,
d t t1 d t t1 d t t1x (m , y )p vc (m ) [m (m , y ) a (m , y )],A t t
the factor of proportionality v (and the implied Lagrange multiplier hd) that
corresponds to any fixed plan for holding cash in the goods markett t1{a (m , y )}t
must be set so that the deviant household’s period 0 budget constraint holds
with equality. The relevant budget constraint is then written as

t t t t1 t t1B¯p Q(m )P(m ){vc (m ) g [m(m , y ) a(m , y )]}  A t
tp1
t t1 t1 t t1# z(m , y )f(y )dmdy ,
where if is in the intervalt d t1 t2 d t t1z(m , y )p 1 {[y  a (m , y )]/m } a (m , y )t1 t1 t
and otherwise.t[y (vc (m ), m )/m , y (vc (m ), m )/m ] z(m , y )p 0L A t t t H A t t t t1
Next observe that, since the cutoffs and are mon-y (vc (m ), m ) y (vc (m ), m )L A t t H A t t
otonically increasing in v for all values of mt, no deviant household would choose
a plan for holding cash in the goods market such that the impliedt t1{a (m , y )}t
factor of proportionality v was so small that for ally (vc (m ), m ) ≤ y (c (m ), m )H A t t L A t t
possible realizations of mt. To see this, observe that the consumption of such a
deviant household would lie below the consumption we have constructed for a
household that never holds cash in the goods market in every possible state of
nature mt, Thus the utility of such a deviant household would have to bet1y .
lower than that of a household that never held cash in the goods market. Let
v¯p sup {vFy (vc (m ), m ) ≤ y (c (m ), m )}.H A t t L A t t
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Lemma 3. It is optimal for a household to never hold over cash in the goods
market if, for all mt, and ¯a ≥ 0, v ≥ v,
y (vc (m ),m )aH A t1 t1y (vc (m ),m ) y  a f(y )H A t t t t′ ′ tU 1 b U g(m Fm )dy dm  t1 t t1( ) ( )m m mt m y (vc (m ),m )a t1 t1t1 L A t1 t1
′U (vc (m ))A t1
 b [F(y (vc (m ), m ) a) 1 L A t1 t1
mm t1t1
t F(y (vc (m ), m ) a)]g(m Fm )dm .H A t1 t1 t1 t1
Proof. Given any plan for holding cash in the goods market andt t1{a (m , y )}t
an associated value of v, the highest consumption that a deviant household
could have in period t is and thus is the′y (vc (m ), m )/m , U (y (vc (m ), m )/m )H A t t t H A t t t
smallest marginal utility of consumption it could have in that period. The terms
on the right side of the condition in the lemma are the expected value of the
product of the marginal utility of consumption and the return to holding cur-
rency in the goods market ( ) in period Thus the condition in the1/m t 1.t1
lemma ensures that such a household always prefers to consume its real balances
in period t rather than carry them over into period at a rate of returnt 1
Therefore, this condition implies that no plan for holding cash in the1/m .t1
goods market gives higher utility than the plan of never holding cash in the
goods market.
Appendix B
In this Appendix, we solve for f when the endowment y is lognormal, with
having a normal distribution with mean zero and variance The resource2log y j .y
constraint is
(c  g)[F(log y ; 0, j ) 1 F(log y ; 0, j )]A L y H y
log yH 2 21 1 1 w jy
 exp(w)exp  dwp exp , ( ) ( )[ ]m 2 j 2¯ j 2p log y yLy
where is the cumulative distribution function of a normal meanF(log y ; 0, j )L y
zero standard deviation jy evaluated at We can compute the integral oflog y .L
the resource constraint as follows:
log yH 21 1 1 w
exp(w)exp  dw ( )[ ]m 2 j¯ j 2p log y yLy
log yH2 2 21 j 1 1 w jy y
p exp exp  dw. (B1)( ) ( )[ ]m 2 2 j¯ j 2p log y yLy
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Now the right side of (B1) is the integral of the density of a normal distribution
with mean and variance Thus the resource constraint can be written as2 2j j .y y
(c  g)[F(log y ; 0, j ) 1 F(log y ; 0, j )]A L y H y
2 21 j jy y2 2 exp [F(log y ; j , j ) F(log y ; j , j )]p exp . (B2)H y y L y y( ) ( )m 2 2¯
Given m, the equilibrium values of cA, yL, and yH are found as the solution to
equations (5) and (7). We solve these equations numerically for jp 2, gp
and so that annualized inflation is 3 percent. With.25.005, j p .03, mp 1.03 ,¯y
these parameters, fp 2.14.
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